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______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This matter comes on before this Court on B&G 
Construction Company’s petition for review of a decision and 
final order of the Benefits Review Board (“the Board”) of the 
United States Department of Labor (“DOL”) dated August 30, 
2010, that reversed an administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) 
decision and order denying respondent Norma G. Campbell’s 
(“Campbell”) claim for survivor’s benefits pursuant to 
provisions of the Black Lung Benefits Act, as amended, 30 
U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (the “Act”).  The Board determined that 
Campbell was entitled derivatively to survivor’s benefits under 
30 U.S.C. § 932(l), as last amended by the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“PPACA”), Pub. L. No. 111-
148, § 1556, 124 Stat. 119, 260, based on her late husband 
Ernest J. Campbell’s (“Ernest”) totally disabling 
pneumoconiosis.1
There is disagreement among the parties regarding the 
effect of the PPACA on the Act focusing on the meaning of 
section 932(l).
   
2
                                                 
1 Pneumoconiosis is “a chronic dust disease of the lung and its 
sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments, 
arising out of coal mine employment.”  20 C.F.R. § 718.201. 
  Section 932(l) provides that eligible survivors 
 
2 There are four parties in these proceedings, B&G, the State 
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of a deceased miner, who was determined to be eligible to 
receive benefits at the time of his death, are not required to file a 
new claim for benefits after the death of the miner.  The section 
1556 PPACA amendment to section 932(l), which Congress 
made retroactively applicable to any claim for survivors’ 
benefits filed after January 1, 2005, removed a limitation from 
section 932(l) which Congress inserted in 1981 restricting the 
applicability of that section to claims filed before January 1, 
1982.   Prior to 1982, section 932(l) allowed eligible survivors 
of miners to continue receiving benefits without having to file a 
new claim after a miner’s death.  For claims filed on or after 
January 1, 1982, section 932(l) prior to the enactment of section 
1556 required eligible survivors to file claims and prove that 
pneumoconiosis caused the miner’s death in order to receive 
survivors’ benefits.  The DOL, at oral argument before us, 
contended that the PPACA amendment, by removing the 
limiting language that the 1981 amendments inserted, returned 
the statute to its original function: automatically continuing 
benefits for the survivors of miners who had been determined to 
be eligible to receive benefits during their lifetimes.    
Our function in ascertaining the meaning of the Act is 
complicated by the presence of limiting language in sections 921 
and 922 of the Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 921 and 922, paralleling the 
language that the PPACA amendment deleted from section 
932(l).  B&G has argued that this limiting language requires 
                                                                                                             
Workers Insurance Fund (though not further identified in the 
caption presumably that of Pennsylvania), the Director, Office 
of Workers’ Compensation Programs, and Norma G. Campbell, 
widow of Ernest J. Campbell.  
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survivors to prove that pneumoconiosis caused a miner’s death 
in order to receive survivors’ benefits.  As we discuss below, we 
hold that amended section 932(l), being the last amendment of 
the Act and thus the latest legislation governing survivors’ 
benefits, overrides the conflicting language in sections 921 and 
922 and entitles otherwise eligible survivors of a miner to 
receive benefits upon a miner’s death without having to prove 
that pneumoconiosis caused the miner’s death.    
Alternatively, B&G argues that if we adopt the DOL’s 
reading of PPACA section 1556, section 932(l) will violate the 
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution in two 
respects in that the section as amended will violate B&G’s 
substantive due process rights and it will effectuate a regulatory 
taking of B&G’s property without the payment of just 
compensation.3
 
  B&G also argues that Campbell has failed to 
establish that pneumoconiosis caused, contributed to, or 
hastened the death of her husband.  For the reasons that follow, 
we will deny the petition for review.    
II. THE BLACK LUNG BENEFITS ACT 
 
                                                 
3 Though we use the term “alternatively” in this opinion, as we 
discuss below B&G’s argument concerning the constitutionality 
of the PPACA amendment was the only issue it properly raised 
in its petition. 
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A.  The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act  
Inasmuch as our resolution of this case requires us to 
interpret a section of the Black Lung Benefits Act, we find it 
helpful to recount the history of the Act while focusing on 
provisions relating to survivors’ benefits.  As we indicated 20 
years ago, “[t]he statutory background we confront could hardly 
be more complicated.”  Helen Mining Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 924 
F.2d 1269, 1271-73 (3d Cir. 1991) (en banc).4
Congress first provided benefits to the dependents of coal 
miners affected with pneumoconiosis in the Federal Coal Mine 
Health and Safety Act of 1969 (“FCMHSA”), 30 U.S.C. § 841 
et seq.  See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 8, 
96 S.Ct. 2882, 2889 (1976).  Originally, the FCMHSA created a 
bifurcated system for black lung benefit claims: (1) pursuant to 
Part B of the Act the Social Security Administration, in the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), 
adjudicated all claims filed on or before December 31, 1972, 
and paid benefits out of the federal fisc; and (2) pursuant to Part 
C of the Act, the Department of Labor (DOL) administered all 
claims filed on or after January 1, 1973, but state workers’ 
compensation programs that the DOL found provided adequate 
coverage for black lung disability would pay eligible miners’ 
claims, or, if the DOL had not approved a germane state 
program, responsible mine operators or their successors would 
pay for approved claims.  Helen Mining, 924 F.2d at 1271.   
   
                                                 
4 We wrote Helen in 1991 and since then with the enactment of 
the PPACA the statutory background has gotten even more 
complicated. 
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The introductory section to Title IV of the FCMHSA 
reflected Congress’ intent to provide for benefits to miners 
totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis and the surviving 
dependents of miners whose death was due to pneumoconiosis: 
Congress finds and declares that there are a 
significant number of coal miners living today 
who are totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis 
arising out of employment in one or more of the 
Nation’s underground coal mines; that there are a 
number of survivors of coal miners whose deaths 
were due to this disease; and that few States 
provide benefits for death or disability due to this 
disease to coal miners or their surviving 
dependents.  It is, therefore, the purpose of this 
title to provide benefits, in cooperation with the 
States, to coal miners who are totally disabled due 
to pneumoconiosis and to the surviving 
dependents of miners whose death was due to 
such disease; and to ensure that in the future 
adequate benefits are provided to coal miners and 
their dependents in the event of their death or total 
disability due to pneumoconiosis.   
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 
91-173, 83 Stat. 792, 792 (1969) (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 
901(a) (West 2007)) (emphasis added). 
Section 921(a), which regulated the payment of benefits 
under Part B, stated that: “[t]he Secretary shall, in accordance 
with the provisions of this part, and the regulations promulgated 
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by him under this part, make payments of benefits in respect of 
total disability of any miner due to pneumoconiosis, and in 
respect of death any miner whose death was due to 
pneumoconiosis.”  Id. at 793 (emphasis added).  Section 922(a), 
also under Part B, regulated payments to widows and stated that: 
“In the case of death of a miner due to pneumoconiosis or of a 
miner receiving benefits under this part, benefits shall be paid to 
his widow (if any) at the rate the deceased miner would receive 
such benefits if he were totally disabled.”  Id. at 794 (emphasis 
added).  Accordingly, the HEW under the FCMHSA required 
widows of coal miners to prove that the miner died due to 
pneumoconiosis in order to receive survivors’ benefits even if 
the miner had been receiving pneumoconiosis disability benefits. 
 See John S. Lopatto III, The Federal Black Lung Program: A 
1983 Primer, 85 W. Va. L. Rev. 677, 684 (1983) (stating that a 
significant problem with the FCMHSA was HEW’s high denial 
rate of widows’ claims who could not produce evidence that 
miner had died due to pneumoconiosis).     
B.  The 1972 Amendments – Liberalizing the                
                 FCMHSA 
Partially in response to the HEW’s high denial rate of 
claims and also in response to the backlog in the administration 
of black lung claims, Congress in 1972, before the effective date 
of Part C, amended the FCMHSA and redesignated Title IV of 
the Act as the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972.  Black Lung 
Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 150 (1972); 
Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 685, 111 S.Ct. 
2524, 2528 (1991).  The 1972 amendments made it easier for 
survivors to prove entitlement to benefits under Part B and 
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continued Part C in existence until December 30, 1981.  Helen 
Mining, 924 F.2d at 1271.  Congress, through the 1972 
amendments, specifically provided benefits to survivors of a 
miner totally disabled from pneumoconiosis even if he died 
from a cause unrelated to pneumoconiosis.  Lopatto, 85 W. Va. 
L. Rev. at 685.  It accomplished this goal by amending the Act 
in three places, two of which are significant on this appeal.5
First, Congress after the appearance of the word 
“disease” at appropriate places inserted into section 901 of the 
Black Lung Benefits Act the phrase “or who were totally 
disabled by this disease at the time of their deaths.” Black Lung 
Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 150, 154 
(1972).  Thus, after the 1972 amendments section 901 stated 
that: 
   
Congress finds and declares that there are a 
significant number of coal miners living today 
who are totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis 
arising out of employment in one or more of the 
Nation’s coal mines; that there are a number of 
survivors of coal miners whose deaths were due 
to this disease or who were totally disabled by this 
                                                 
5 Congress also amended 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(3) to ensure that 
survivors of miners who suffered from complicated 
pneumoconiosis, an especially severe form of the disease which 
is not at issue in this case, was entitled to receive benefits even 
if the miner died from causes unrelated to complicated 
pneumoconiosis.  See Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L. 
No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 150, 154 (1972).  
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disease at the time of their deaths; and that few 
States provide benefits for death or disability due 
to this disease to coal miners or their surviving 
dependents.  It is, therefore, the purpose of this 
subchapter to provide benefits, in cooperation 
with the States, to coal miners who are totally 
disabled due to pneumoconiosis and to the 
surviving dependents of miners whose death was 
due to such disease or who were totally disabled 
by this disease at the time of their deaths; and to 
insure that in the future adequate benefits are 
provided to coal miners and their dependents in 
the event of their death or total disability due to 
pneumoconiosis.   
30 U.S.C. § 901 (West 1976).  In addition, the 1972 
amendments inserted the phrase “or who at the time of his death 
was totally disabled by pneumoconiosis” in section 921(a) and 
thus amended section 921(a) to state: 
The Secretary shall, in accordance with the 
provisions of this part, and the regulations 
promulgated by him under this part, make 
payments of benefits in respect of total disability 
of any miner due to pneumoconiosis, and in 
respect of death any miner whose death was due 
to pneumoconiosis or who at the time of his death 
was totally disabled by pneumoconiosis. 
30 U.S.C. § 921(a) (West 1976). 
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 With the 1972 amendments Congress made it clear that 
survivors, under Part B, were entitled to receive benefits 
regardless of whether pneumoconiosis caused the death of a 
miner provided the miner was receiving black lung benefits 
during his lifetime.6
 Inasmuch as the DOL did not approve any state workers’ 
compensation programs between the enactment of the FCMHSA 
and the expiration of part B, starting in 1973 the DOL 
administered part C as a federally run workers’ compensation 
program and it continues to do so today.  When the DOL began 
processing part C claims it applied the permanent HEW 
regulations which were much more restrictive than the interim 
regulations that HEW promulgated for Part B claims.  Lopatto, 
  Moreover, Congress extended part B 
coverage until December 30, 1973, and established a “transition 
period” between July 1, 1973, and December 31, 1973, during 
which all part B claims would be tendered to the DOL and 
treated as claims under part C.  Helen Mining, 924 F.2d at 1271 
n.3.  In order to expedite the processing of the large backlog of 
claims, the Secretary of the HEW promulgated interim 
regulations which expired after June 30, 1973, for living miners’ 
claims and December 31, 1973, for survivors’ claims.  Pittston 
Coal Grp. v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 109, 109 S.Ct. 414, 418 
(1988).  The application of the interim regulations in place of 
HEW’s stricter permanent regulations resulted in a surge of 
approvals for claims filed under part B.  Pauley, 501 U.S. at 687, 
111 S.Ct. at 2529.        
                                                 
6 The 1972 amendments did not alter section 922, which 
regulated payment to widows under part B.   
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85 W. Va. L. Rev. at 691.  In addition, part C required widows 
to file a claim for benefits “within three years of the discovery 
of total disability due to pneumoconiosis or, in the case of death 
due to pneumoconiosis, the date of such death.”  30 U.S.C. § 
932(f) (West 1976).  The statute of limitations combined with 
DOL’s application of the more restrictive permanent regulations 
again resulted in a backlog of administrative claims and the 
denial of thousands of survivors’ benefits claims.  Lopatto, 85 
W. Va. L. Rev. at 691.      
 C. The 1977 Amendments 
In response to a backlog of claims and the low approval 
rate, Congress passed the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 
1977 and “further liberalized the criteria for eligibility for black 
lung benefits in several ways.”7
                                                 
7 The FCMHSA and the 1972 and 1977 amendments followed a 
distinct pattern: 
  Pauley, 501 U.S. at 688, 111 
 
Congress passed a statute intended to provide 
wide-spread benefits to miners disabled by black 
lung disease. The benefits, while never very high, 
were intended to be liberally awarded. 
Administrative practice, however, did not 
comport with legislative intent, and twice 
Congress was impelled to specify its intentions 
more clearly, in order to insure as broad coverage 
as possible.  
 
Echo v. Dir., OWCP, 744 F.2d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 1984) 
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S.Ct. at 2529.  Most pertinent to this appeal, in the 1977 
amendments Congress added section 932(l) to part C which 
provided that “[i]n no case shall the eligible survivors of a miner 
who was determined to be eligible to receive benefits under this 
title at the time of his or her death be required to file a new 
claim for benefits, or refile or otherwise revalidate the claim of 
such miner.”  Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. 
No. 95-239, §7(h), 92 Stat. 95, 100 (1978)(codified at 30 U.S.C. 
§ 932(l)).  According to the Senate report accompanying the 
legislation, the purpose of the provision was to “correct an 
egregious inequity” arising under part C so that widows of 
miners who had been approved to receive benefits under no 
circumstance would be required to “refile or otherwise 
revalidate an approved miner’s claim when the miner dies.”  S. 
Rep. No. 95-209 at 18 (1977). 
The effect of this language, actually enacted in 1978, was 
to enable dependents of miners who were receiving black lung 
disability benefits at the time of death automatically to continue 
receiving benefits without having to refile a claim, or file a new 
claim, with proof that the miner died from pneumoconiosis.  
Pet’r’s br. at 23; Pothering v. Parkson Coal Co., 861 F.2d 1321, 
1327-28 (3d Cir. 1988).  Section 932(l), along with the other 
1977 amendments to the Act, reflected Congress’ intention “not 
to impose a heavy burden of proof on claimants generally and 
widows in particular.”  Id. at 1326-27.  
D. The 1981 Amendments 
                                                                                                             
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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 After the 1977 amendments, the number of black lung 
benefit claims soared, a development which began to “wreak 
havoc” in the coal industry and caused Congress again to amend 
the Act in 1981 with the Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-119, 95 Stat. 1635, 1644 (codified at 26 
U.S.C. § 4121 (West 1982)), and the Black Lung Benefits 
Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-119, 95 Stat. 1643 
(codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 922, 923 (West 1982)) (collectively 
“the 1981 amendments”).  Helen Mining, 924 F.2d at 1273.  
Among other measures, the 1981 amendments eliminated 
survivors’ automatic entitlement to benefits for claims filed on 
or after January 1, 1982, by adding to section 932(l) the phrase 
“except with respect to a claim filed under this part on or after 
the effective date of the Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 
1981.”  30 U.S.C. § 932(l) (West 1982).  Thus, after the 1981 
amendments, section 932(l) read as follows: 
In no case shall the eligible survivors of a miner 
who was determined to be eligible to receive 
benefits under this subchapter at the time of his or 
her death be required to file a new claim for 
benefits, or refile or otherwise revalidate the 
claim of such miner, except with respect to a 
claim filed under this part on or after the effective 
date of the Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 
1981. 
30 U.S.C. § 932(l) (West 1982), as amended by Black Lung 
Benefits Revenue Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-119, § 203(a)(6), 
95 Stat. 1635, 1644 (1981). 
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The 1981 amendments added similar limiting language to 
Part B, including to sections 30 U.S.C. §§ 921(a), 922(a)(2), 
(a)(3), and (a)(5), so that after the amendments section 922(a)(2) 
stated:   
In the case of death of a miner due to 
pneumoconiosis or, except with respect to a claim 
filed under part C of this subchapter on or after 
the effective date of the Black Lung Benefits 
Amendments of 1981, of a miner receiving 
benefits under this part, benefits shall be paid to 
his widow (if any) at the rate the deceased miner 
would receive such benefits if he were totally 
disabled. 
30 U.S.C. § 922(a)(2) (West 1982).8
The Secretary shall, in accordance with the 
provisions of this part, and the regulations 
promulgated by him under this part, make 
payments of benefits in respect of total disability 
of any miner due to pneumoconiosis, and in 
respect of death of any miner whose death was 
due to pneumoconiosis or, except with respect to 
a claim filed under part C of this subchapter on or 
  And section 921(a) 
stated: 
                                                 
8 Inasmuch as we focus on this appeal on a widow’s survivor 
benefits, we will not discuss in depth the changes to sections 
922(a)(3) and (a)(5), aside from noting that Congress used the 
same limiting language in those sections. 
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after the effective date of the Black Lung Benefits 
Amendments of 1981, who at the time of his 
death was totally disabled by pneumoconiosis. 
30 U.S.C. § 921(a) (West 1982). 
Finally, the 1981 amendments also reversed the 1972 
amendments’ changes to 30 U.S.C. § 901, the general purpose 
section of the Act, by striking the phrase “or who were totally 
disabled by this disease at the time of their deaths,” so that the 
amended section stated: 
Congress finds and declares that there are a 
significant number of coal miners living today 
who are totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis 
arising out of employment in one or more of the 
Nation’s coal mines; that there are a number of 
survivors of coal miners whose deaths were due 
to this disease; and that few States provide 
benefits for death or disability due to this disease 
to coal miners or their surviving dependents.  It is, 
therefore, the purpose of this subchapter to 
provide benefits, in cooperation with the States, to 
coal miners who are totally disabled due to 
pneumoconiosis and to the surviving dependents 
of miners whose death was due to such disease; 
and to insure that in the future adequate benefits 
are provided to coal miners and their dependents 
in the event of their death or total disability due to 
pneumoconiosis. 
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30 U.S.C. § 901(a) (West 1982) (emphasis added). 
Under the amended Act, miners’ survivors who filed 
claims on or after January 1, 1982, could establish their 
entitlement to benefits only by demonstrating that the miner died 
due to pneumoconiosis.  See Mancia v. Dir., OWCP, U.S. DOL, 
130 F.3d 579, 584 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997).  A dependent could make 
this showing by producing direct evidence that pneumoconiosis 
was a substantial or contributing cause to the miner’s death or 
by proving that the miner suffered from “complicated 
pneumoconiosis” as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 718.304, thereby 
invoking an irrebuttable statutory presumption of death 
causation under 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(3).9
E. The PPACA Amendments   
  See 20 C.F.R. § 
718.205(c)(3).   
 After 1981 section 932(l) of the Act remained unaltered 
until Congress passed the PPACA in 2010.  Section 1556(b) of 
the PPACA, entitled “Equity for Certain Eligible Survivors,” 
amended the Act by deleting the limiting clause of section 932(l) 
that the 1981 amendments inserted:   
(b) CONTINUATION OF BENEFITS.—
Section 422(l) of the Black Lung Benefits Act (30 
                                                 
9 Complicated pneumoconiosis is “the most severe stage of 
Black Lung disease under the classification system established 
under the program.” Dir. OWCP, U.S. DOL v. N. Am. Coal Co., 
626 F.2d 1137, 1138 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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U.S.C. § 932(l)) is amended by striking “, except 
with respect to a claim filed under this part on or 
after the effective date of the Black Lung Benefits 
Amendments of 1981”. 
Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1556.10
Filing of new claims or refiling or revalidation of 
claims of miners already determined eligible at 
time of death 
  Thus, 30 U.S.C. § 932(l) 
now reads as it did after the 1977 amendments but before 
the 1981 amendments: 
In no case shall the eligible survivors of a miner 
who was determined to be eligible to receive 
benefits under this subchapter at the time of his or 
her death be required to file a new claim for 
benefits, or refile or otherwise revalidate the 
claim of such miner,.11
30 U.S.C. § 932(l).  
 
 The amended section applied to claims for survivors’ 
benefits, such as Campbell’s, filed after January 1, 2005, and 
pending on or after March 23, 2010, the PPACA’s enactment 
                                                 
10 Section 1556 also restored the rebuttable presumption 
benefitting miners who were employed in an underground coal 
mine for 15 years or more found in 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4).    
 
11 The comma before the period is in the statute. 
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date.  Pub. L. No. 111-148. § 1556(c) (2010).12
Mr. President, in order to clarify for the record, I 
want to make it known that section 1556 of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is 
intended to apply to all claims filed after January 
1, 2005, that are pending on or after the date of 
enactment of that act. 
  Senator Robert 
C. Byrd of West Virginia, the sponsor of the amendment, made 
the following statement on the floor of the Senate after the 
passage of the PPACA: 
It is clear that the section will apply to all claims 
that will be filed henceforth, including many 
claims filed by miners whose prior claims were 
denied, or by widows who never filed for benefits 
following the death of a husband. But section 
1556 will also benefit all of the claimants who 
have recently filed a claim, and are awaiting or 
appealing a decision or order, or who are in the 
midst of trying to determine whether to seek a 
                                                 
12 We note that PPACA relieves a survivor from filing a new 
claim for benefits provided the survivor files a claim for benefits 
after January 1, 2005, a seeming inconsistency.  The parties’ 
briefs do not explain how the Act is applied administratively but 
surely a widow seeking benefits must file something in order to 
receive them.  After all, notwithstanding section 1556 a claimant 
might not be the miner’s real widow.  But what a widow does 
not have to do is establish that the miner died from 
pneumoconiosis. 
 
 20 
modification of a recent order. 
Section 1556 applies immediately to all pending 
claims, including claims that were finally awarded 
or denied prior to the date of enactment of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, for 
which the claimant seeks to modify a denial, or 
for which other actions are taken in order to 
modify an award or denial, in accordance with 20 
CFR 725.309(c) or 725.310. Section 1556 applies 
even if a final order is modified, or actions are 
taken to bring about the modification of an order, 
subsequent to the date of enactment of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, in 
accordance with the sections of Part 725 that I 
mentioned. I look forward to working to ensure 
that claimants get a fair shake as they try to gain 
access to these benefits that have been so hard 
won. 
156 Cong. Rec. at 2083S–84S (daily ed. March 25, 2010) 
(statement of Sen. Byrd). 
 Other than Senator Byrd’s statement and a press release 
from his office that we quote below, see infra note 19, section 
1556 of the PPACA does not have a legislative history, at least 
of which we are aware.  Notwithstanding the seeming 
inconsistency of section 1556 and the earlier version of the Act, 
the PPACA amendment did not remove the language Congress 
inserted in the Act in the 1981 amendments in sections 921 and 
922 in part B requiring a survivor of a miner to show a causation 
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connection between the miner’s pneumoconiosis and his death 
nor did Congress alter section 901, the general purpose 
declaration of the Act.  Significantly, section 932(c) states the 
following: 
 (c) Persons entitled to benefits 
Benefits shall be paid during such period by each 
such operator under this section to the categories 
of persons entitled to benefits under section 
922(a) of this title in accordance with the 
regulations of the Secretary applicable under this 
section . . . . 
30 U.S.C. § 932(c).  Section 922(a)(2), relating to payment of 
benefits to widows, states:   
In the case of death of a miner due to 
pneumoconiosis or, except with respect to a claim 
filed under part C of this subchapter on or after 
the effective date of the Black Lung Benefits 
Amendments of 1981, of a miner receiving 
benefits under this part, benefits shall be paid to 
his widow (if any) at the rate the deceased miner 
would receive such benefits if he were totally 
disabled. 
30 U.S.C. § 922(a)(2).  Overall the repeated amendments of the 
Act demonstrate that it has been balanced on a sort of 
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congressional seesaw.13
 
  With the legislative history in mind, we 
now will discuss the specific facts of this petition.   
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Ernest worked as a miner for B&G for over 16 years 
from 1970 to 1987.  In 2000, the District Director of the Office 
of Worker’s Compensation found that Ernest was totally 
disabled by coal workers’ pneumoconiosis and awarded him 
black lung benefits under the Act.  Ernest died on April 4, 2005, 
and on February 6, 2006, Campbell, Ernest’s widow, filed a 
timely claim for federal black lung survivor’s benefits, the claim 
which is the subject of the petition for review at the heart of this 
case.  At the time that Campbell filed her claim for survivor’s 
benefits, the applicable regulations required her to prove that 
pneumoconiosis caused, contributed to, or hastened Ernest’s 
death.  See 20 C.F.R. § 718.205.   
                                                 
13 We recognize that there could be a distinction between miners 
eligible for benefits and miners actually receiving benefits 
depending upon factors such as whether an eligible miner sought 
benefits and the possible status of a particular claim.  We, 
however, are not concerned with this distinction because Ernest 
was determined to be eligible for benefits and at the time of his 
death the benefits were being paid and there is no indication that 
that determination has been challenged.  Thus, in this opinion 
we will refer to the concepts of eligibility and receipt of 
payments interchangeably. 
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B&G opposed Campbell’s claim and, after a formal 
administrative hearing, an ALJ determined that pneumoconiosis 
was not the cause of Ernest’s death and thus denied Campbell’s 
claim for survivor’s benefits.  In making his decision, the ALJ 
credited the opinion of B&G’s medical expert, Dr. Gregory 
Fino--who found no evidence that inhalation of coal mine dust 
caused, contributed to, or hastened Ernest’s death--over 
Campbell’s medical expert, Dr. David Evanko, Ernest’s treating 
physician, who found that pneumoconiosis decreased the oxygen 
in Ernest’s blood and hastened his death.   
 On January 28, 2008, Campbell filed an appeal with the 
Board which vacated the ALJ’s Decision and Order Denying 
Benefits and remanded Campbell’s claim for survivor’s benefits 
for the ALJ to resolve a conflict between the two doctors’ 
opinions regarding whether pneumoconiosis hastened Ernest’s 
death.  On remand, the ALJ determined that Ernest’s medical 
records revealed that he was suffering from several lung 
diseases not related to coal dust exposure and, consequently, 
held that Campbell failed to prove that pneumoconiosis caused, 
contributed to, or hastened Ernest’s death and denied her claim 
for survivor’s benefits. 
 Campbell again appealed to the Board.  As we discussed 
above, while this second appeal was pending, Congress 
amended 30 U.S.C. § 932(l) of the Act with the PPACA section 
1556 amendments and made the amendments retroactively 
applicable to all claims for benefits filed after January 1, 2005.  
Therefore, the amendment to section 932 applied to Campbell’s 
claim for benefits.  The Board directed the parties to brief the 
issue of whether Campbell was entitled derivatively to benefits 
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under section 932(l) as amended by section 1556 of the PPACA. 
 Both the DOL and Campbell argued that Campbell was entitled 
derivatively to benefits pursuant to amended section 932(l) 
based on the award of lifetime benefits to Ernest regardless of 
whether Campbell could prove that pneumoconiosis caused or 
hastened Ernest’s death.   B&G argued that, under the PPACA 
amendments, benefits are awarded only if the party opposing the 
awarding of benefits does not rebut the presumption of death 
due to pneumoconiosis and thus the Board should deny 
Campbell’s claim inasmuch as B&G provided medical evidence 
which rebutted the presumption that Ernest died because of the 
effects of pneumoconiosis.   
On August 30, 2010, the Board reversed the ALJ’s 
Decision and Order, and remanded the claim to the director for 
an entry of an order awarding Campbell survivor’s benefits.  
The Board held that section 932(l), as amended by section 1556 
of the PPACA, entitled Campbell to benefits inasmuch as Ernest 
was receiving black lung benefits at the time of his death and 
Campbell’s claim was filed after January 1, 2005.  
Consequently, the Board had no need to consider Campbell’s 
argument that the ALJ erred in making his findings under 20 
C.F.R. § 718.205(c) that pneumoconiosis did not cause, 
contribute to, or hasten Ernest’s death and it did not consider 
that question.  B&G filed a timely petition for review from the 
Board’s order in this Court and we review that petition in these 
proceedings. 
In its opening brief, B&G challenged section 1556 of the 
PPACA only on the ground that the amendment violated the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process and Takings Clauses, an 
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approach that essentially acknowledged that under the amended 
Act as written Campbell was entitled to benefits.14  Nevertheless 
we found, understandably we think, that Congress’ intent might 
not be clear with respect to elimination of the causation of death 
requirement so, after we scheduled the case for oral argument, 
the Clerk of the Court, at our direction, issued a notice to the 
parties to “be prepared at oral argument to discuss what effect, if 
any, 30 U.S.C. § 932(c)’s ‘entitle[ment] to benefits’ provision – 
which incorporates by reference § 922(a)’s benefits payment 
schedules – has on the meaning of the phrase ‘eligible 
survivors,’ as used in 30 U.S.C. § 932(l).”15
                                                 
14 Though B&G cites both the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, 
we treat its claim as relying only on the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment inasmuch as the Fourteenth Amendment 
applies only to acts under color of state law whereas the Fifth 
Amendment applies to actions of the federal government.  See 
U.S. Const. amend. V; U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.     
   
  
15  We recognize that, generally, courts of appeals do not decide 
questions which were not raised properly in the parties’ briefs.  
Nevertheless we have the discretionary authority to raise and 
consider the meaning of section 932(l) within the overall 
application of the Act.  See  United States Nat'l Bank of Oregon 
v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 447, 113 
S.Ct. 2173, 2178-79 (1993) (“a court may consider an issue 
‘antecedent to…and ultimately dispositive of’ the dispute before 
it, even an issue the parties fail to identify and brief”).  As 
Justice Souter explained, “[t]he contrary conclusion would 
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After receiving the Clerk’s notification, B&G, in its 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 28(j) letter and at oral 
argument, took the position that in resolving its petition for 
review we can avoid deciding the constitutional issues it raised 
in its opening and reply briefs and, instead, hold that section 
932(l) applies only to miners diagnosed with complicated 
pneumoconiosis, a more severe form of pneumoconiosis than 
that from which Ernest suffered.16
                                                                                                             
permit litigants, by agreeing on the legal issue presented, to 
extract the opinion of a court on hypothetical Acts of Congress 
or dubious constitutional principles, an opinion that would be 
difficult to characterize as anything but advisory.” Id.  See also 
In re Chevron Corp., 650 F.3d 276, 289 n.15 (3d Cir. 2011).  
Moreover, were we to resolve the meaning of section 932(l) as 
B&G suggests, we would avoid ruling on its constitutional 
arguments.  If is, of course, a basic tenet that “we must avoid 
deciding a constitutional question if the case may be disposed of 
on some other basis.”  Doe v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 513 
F.3d 95, 102 (3d Cir. 2008).  Accordingly, it is appropriate that 
we raise and consider the question of statutory interpretation 
before addressing B&G’s constitutional arguments.  See Tenafly 
Eruv Ass'n. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 158 n.15 (3d 
Cir. 2002). 
  Thus, B&G argued that 
claimants such as Campbell, who did not seek derivative 
benefits predicated on the claim of a miner suffering from 
complicated pneumoconiosis, would need to prove that 
 
16 B&G made the argument that section 932(l) applied only to 
complicated pneumoconiosis for the first time at oral argument 
before us. 
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pneumoconiosis was the cause of the miner’s death in order to 
be classified as “eligible survivors” under section 932(l) so as to 
receive survivors’ benefits.  The DOL responded to our letter by 
contending that to the extent that amended 932(l) conflicts with 
language in other sections of the Act, section 932(l) is 
controlling and implicitly repeals the other sections.           
 
IV. JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The Board had jurisdiction to review the ALJ’s decision 
pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3).  We have jurisdiction over 
B&G’s petition for review under 33 U.S.C. § 921(c)(3) as the 
injury in this case occurred in Pennsylvania.  “We review the 
decisions of the Board for errors of law and to assure that it has 
adhered to its own standard of review.” BethEnergy Mines Inc. 
v. Dir., OWCP, 39 F.3d 458, 462-63 (3d Cir. 1994).  We 
exercise plenary review over all questions of law.  Id. at 463.     
 
V. DISCUSSION 
 A.  Section 932(l)  
 Before we address the constitutionality of section 1556, 
the question which B&G originally addressed in bringing the 
petition for review in this Court, we consider the conflict we 
observed in our study of amended section 932(l) and other 
sections of the Act.   
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 Though we alluded to the internal inconsistency in the 
Act, as amended, in section II of this opinion, we will describe 
the exact nature of the conflict in more detail here.  As we have 
discussed, section 932(l) now provides that under no 
circumstances “shall the eligible survivors of a miner who was 
determined to be eligible to receive benefits under this 
subchapter at the time of his or her death be required to file a 
new claim for benefits, or refile or otherwise revalidate the 
claim of such miner,.”  30 U.S.C. § 932(l).  Section 932(c), titled 
as “[p]ersons entitled to benefits,” states that “[b]enefits shall be 
paid during such period by each such operator under this section 
to the categories of persons entitled to benefits under section 
922(a) of this title in accordance with the regulations of the 
Secretary applicable under this section . . . .” 30 U.S.C. § 932(c). 
 Section 922(a), in turn, still contains the limiting language 
which Congress eliminated in section 932(l) when it passed the 
PPACA:  
(a) Schedules 
Subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this 
section, benefit payments shall be made by the 
Secretary under this part as follows: 
… 
(2) In the case of death of a miner due to 
pneumoconiosis or, except with respect to a claim 
filed under part C of this subchapter on or after 
the effective date of the Black Lung Benefits 
Amendments of 1981, of a miner receiving 
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benefits under this part benefits shall be paid to 
his widow (if any) at the rate the deceased miner 
would receive such benefits if he were totally 
disabled. 
30 U.S.C. § 922(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
 It is clear that notwithstanding the enactment of section 
1556, section 922(a) which regulates the payment of benefits to 
survivors if still effective as written retains the limiting 
causation of death provision of the 1981 amendments and no 
party in these proceedings contends otherwise.  Moreover, 
Congress, in enacting the PPACA did not alter the wording of 
section 901, which states that “the purpose of this subchapter [is 
to] provide benefits . . . to coal miners who are totally disabled 
due to pneumoconiosis and to the surviving dependents of 
miners whose death was due to such disease[.]”  30 U.S.C. § 
901(a).  Finally, Congress did not alter section 921(a), which 
states that the Secretary shall make payments of benefits in 
respect to the death of any miner who was totally disabled by 
pneumoconiosis “except with respect to a claim filed under part 
C of this subchapter on or after the effective date of the Black 
Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981.”  30 U.S.C. § 921(a).  
 When interpreting a statute our purpose is to “give effect 
to Congress’s intent.”  Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d 
137, 141 (3d Cir. 2001).  Of course, in this endeavor in this case 
we start, as always, with the language of the statute we are 
interpreting, here the Act as amended, as we presume that 
Congress most clearly expresses its intent through the plain 
language of a statute.  Id. (citing Idahoan Fresh v. Advantage 
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Produce, Inc., 157 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 1998)).  Where the 
statutory language is plain and unambiguous we rarely need to 
inquire into the meaning of the statute beyond examining its 
wording.  In re Segal, 57 F.3d 342, 346 (3d Cir. 1995).  The rare 
circumstances in which we make further inquiry include cases 
“where the literal application of the statute will produce a result 
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters, or where 
the result would be so bizarre that Congress could not have 
intended it.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  To determine whether the language of the Act is 
ambiguous, “we must examine the language itself, the specific 
context in which that language is used, and the broader context 
of the statute as a whole.”  Rosenberg, 274 F.3d at 141 (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  In addition, when 
interpreting a statute, we strive to give effect to every word 
which Congress used and to avoid any interpretation which 
renders an element of the statute superfluous.  See Duncan v. 
Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 2125 (2001) (“[A] 
statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can 
be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, 
void, or insignificant.”) (quoting Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 
U.S. 112, 115-16 (1879)). 
 The language of section 932(l) in itself is not ambiguous. 
 Quite to the contrary, it is clear and unequivocal.  Statutory 
language “is ambiguous only if it is reasonably susceptible of 
different interpretations.”  In re Visteon Corp., 612 F.3d 210, 
221 (3d Cir. 2010).  The only reasonable interpretation of 
section 932(l), standing alone, is that survivors of miners who 
had been determined to be eligible for black lung benefits at the 
time of their deaths are not required to file new claims for 
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benefits, or to revalidate the claim of the deceased miners.  
Thus, a survivor to be entitled to benefits need not establish that 
pneumoconiosis contributed to a miner’s death.  We are required 
to “presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means 
and means in a statute what it says there.”  Conn. Nat’l Bank v. 
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992).   
 B&G’s argument that section 932(l) is intended to apply 
only to the survivors of miners who suffer from complicated 
pneumoconiosis is unpersuasive.  Miners who are diagnosed 
with complicated pneumoconiosis without regard for the 
PPACA receive the benefit of an irrebuttable presumption that 
they are totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis and that their 
deaths were due to pneumoconiosis under 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(3). 
 B&G’s proposed reading would mean that amended section 
932(l) did not have any effect inasmuch as the survivor of a 
miner who suffered from complicated pneumoconiosis never 
would have to file a new claim for benefits or revalidate the 
claim of the deceased miner because all miners who have been 
diagnosed with complicated pneumoconiosis automatically are 
presumed to have died from pneumoconiosis under section 
921(c)(3).  More importantly, nothing in the language of the 
statute limits section 932(l) to such a narrow scope of eligible 
survivors and nothing in the legislative history, or the history of 
the Act itself, at least of which we are aware, supports B&G’s 
position that the section applies only to the eligible survivors of 
miners who suffered from complicated pneumoconiosis.     
 Even though section 932(l), standing alone, is not 
ambiguous, we recognize that it might be contended that another 
possible interpretation of section 932(l), considering the section 
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in a broader context, as Rosenberg suggests we do, is that only 
“eligible survivors” are relieved from having to file new claims 
and that, in order to determine who qualifies as an “eligible 
survivor,” we should look to section 922(a) which indicates that 
a widow who filed a claim for survivor’s benefits on or after 
January 1, 1982, must prove that the deceased miner died due to 
pneumoconiosis.  Under this interpretation of section 932(l), a 
widow such as Campbell, even though she filed a claim after the 
effective date of the PPACA amendments, though before their 
enactment, would have to prove under section 922(a) that she is 
an “eligible survivor” by showing that pneumoconiosis caused 
Ernest’s death in order to obtain the benefit of amended section 
932(l).  But if Campbell succeeds in proving that she is an 
“eligible survivor” by filing a new claim and showing that 
pneumoconiosis caused Ernest’s death, we do not discern what 
enhancement of her position that she would have received under 
the PPACA amendment of section 932(l), as it relieves eligible 
survivors from having to file new claims for benefits in the first 
place.  In that regard, the possible alternative reading of the Act 
in a broad context that we have advanced suffers from the same 
defect as B&G’s proposed reading focusing on complicated 
pneumoconiosis inasmuch as it leaves section 932(l) without any 
effect in the statutory pattern.  Indeed, under our proposed 
reading of the statute, there seems to be no circumstance in 
which a widow automatically would become an “eligible 
survivor” under section 922(a) upon her husband’s death 
without having to file a new claim and proving that 
pneumoconiosis caused the miner’s death.  Accordingly, we do 
not regard the possible interpretation of section 932(l) that we 
have set forth at this point as rendering that section ambiguous.   
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 After our intensive study of the Act and of the PPACA 
we are quite clear that the logical reading of the Act as it now 
reads is that Congress, by removing with section 1556 the 
limiting language it inserted into the Act in 1981, has returned 
section 932(l) to its pre-1981 function: ensuring the continuation 
of benefits for eligible survivors of miners who were totally 
disabled due to pneumoconiosis at the time of their deaths 
without requiring that the survivors show that pneumoconiosis 
was a cause of death.  As the history of the Act demonstrates, 
section 932(l) always has governed the continuation of benefits 
for survivors of deceased miners who were receiving benefits at 
the time of their deaths.  Congress first passed section 932(1) in 
the 1977 amendments and the accompanying Senate Report 
stated that the purpose of the provision was to “correct an 
egregious inequity” arising under part C so that widows of 
miners who had been approved to receive benefits under no 
circumstance would be required to “refile or otherwise 
revalidate an approved miner’s claim when the miner dies.”  S. 
Rep. No. 95-209 at 18 (1977).  Adhering to Congress’ intent, we 
specifically held in Pothering, 861 F.2d at 1327-28, that, prior to 
1982, the function of section 932(l) was to continue benefits for 
eligible survivors.   
 In 1981, Congress limited the scope of section 932(l) by 
confining the applicability of the section to claims filed prior to 
1982, but, significantly, it otherwise did not change the wording 
of the section, and it therefore follows that notwithstanding the 
1981 amendments, miners’ survivors who had filed claims prior 
to 1982 could continue to benefit from the automatic 
continuation of benefits.  In 2010, the PPACA removed the 
limiting language Congress inserted with the 1981 amendments 
 
 34 
and returned section 932(l) to its pre-1981 form.  The logical 
conclusion from this history is that the wording in section 932(l) 
has the same meaning as it did prior to the 1981 amendments.  It 
therefore is not surprising that the understanding of the parties 
before the Board in this case and originally in the proceedings 
on the petition for review in this Court was that Congress’ 
removal of the limiting language in 1981 restored the section to 
its original function: “[B&G] does not dispute that [Campbell] 
need not prove that the miner’s death was due to 
pneumoconiosis.”  App. at 398; see generally pet’r’s br.  It was 
not until the Clerk at our direction called the parties’ attention to 
the language in section 922 that B&G altered its position and 
argued that section 932(l) applied only to miners affected with 
complicated pneumoconiosis. 
 Further, while there is no clear legislative history behind 
section 1556, there are clues to Congress’ intent in the wording 
of the amendment.  Section 1556 is entitled “Equity for Certain 
Eligible Survivors,” and section (b) specifically is titled 
“CONTINUATION OF BENEFITS.”  Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 
1556.  As the Supreme Court has observed, “the title of a statute 
or section can aid in resolving an ambiguity in the legislation’s 
text.”  INS v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 
183, 189, 112 S.Ct. 551, 556 (1991).17
                                                 
17 As Chief Justice Marshall once observed, “where the mind 
labors to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes 
everything from which aid can be derived; and in such cases the 
title claims a degree of notice, and will have its due share of 
consideration.”  United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 
386 (1805). 
  Here, the title of section 
 
 35 
1556 supports a reading of that section that the amendment 
returned section 932(l) to its pre-1981 amendments function as 
regulating the “continuation of benefits” for eligible survivors of 
a miner who the DOL determined was eligible to receive 
benefits under subchapter C.   
 In addition, we also think it is appropriate to give some 
consideration to Senator Byrd’s statement that we quoted that he 
made after the passage of section 1556, though by doing so we 
do not suggest that our opinion of section 1556’s meaning 
would have been different without it.  In considering this 
statement we have not lost sight of the Supreme Court’s 
statement that “[p]ost-enactment legislative history is not only 
oxymoronic but inherently entitled to little weight.”  
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 530 n.27, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 
1460 n.27 (2007) (quoting Cobell v. Norton, 428 F.3d 1070, 
1075 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).18
                                                                                                             
 
  Though Senator Byrd made his 
comments about section 1556 after Congress passed the 
amendment, we think his statement is nevertheless significant 
inasmuch as he was the sponsor of section 1556, a single 
18 We note that both the Supreme Court and the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in the opinion the 
Supreme Court quoted made that statement in regard to using a 
later Congress’ appropriations bills to interpret a statute that an 
earlier Congress had passed.  Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 529-
30, 127 S.Ct. at 1460; Cobell, 428 F.3d at 1075.  In contrast, 
here Senator Byrd made the comments about the applicability of 
section 1556 two days after Congress passed the PPACA so his 
statement surely was not stale.   
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amendment in a complex bill of great length.  See N. Haven Bd. 
of Ed. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-27, 102 S.Ct. 1912, 1920-21 
(1982) (“Although the statements of one legislator made during 
debate may not be controlling . . . Senator Bayh’s remarks, as 
those of the sponsor of the language ultimately enacted, are an 
authoritative guide to the statute’s construction.”); Fed. Energy 
Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564, 96 S.Ct. 
2295, 2304 (1976) (indicating that a statement of one of the 
legislation’s sponsors deserves to be accorded substantial weight 
in interpreting the statute); see also Babbitt v. Sweet Home 
Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 714, 727, 115 
S.Ct. 2407, 2421, 2427 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[W]hat 
those who brought the legislation to the floor thought it meant 
[is as solid evidence] as any ever to be found in legislative 
history . . . .”).  Thus, while Senator Byrd’s statement that he 
“look[ed] forward to working to ensure that claimants get a fair 
shake as they try to gain access to these benefits that have been 
so hard won,” is hardly conclusive on the issue we face, overall 
his statement certainly supports our holding that Congress 
intended section 1556 to ensure that survivors of miners who 
were totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis during their 
lifetimes would not have to file new claims for survivors’ 
benefits after the deaths of the miners and establish that there 
was a causation between the miners’ pneumoconiosis and their 
deaths.19
                                                 
19 Senator Byrd’s office in a March 22, 2010 press release more 
explicitly described the claimed benefits of section 1556 than he 
did in his statement that we quoted above: 
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Of course, even though we find no ambiguity in section 
932(l) there is no escape from the reality that the Act contains 
the other provisions to which we have referred that are 
inconsistent with the language of section 932(l).  But “[w]here 
                                                                                                             
Senator Byrd’s provisions in the bill will 
streamline the application process to provide 
benefits more promptly.  There are two key 
provisions Byrd inserted into the bill: 
 
--In cases where a miner has accumulated 15 or 
more years of coal mine employment, and there is 
medical evidence of totally disabled lung disease, 
there will be a legal presumption that the miner 
and his widow would be entitled to benefits – 
unless there is evidence proving that the miner’s 
disease was not black lung, or that the disease did 
not result from coal mine employment; and 
 
--For widows of coal miners who [sic] spouses 
suffered from totally-disabling black lung disease 
and were collecting benefits, they would no 
longer have to reapply to retain their modest 
benefits. 
 
Press Release, United States Senator Robert C. Byrd, Byrd 
Applauds Passage of Health Care Reform Act Which Includes 
Provisions to Help Victims of Black Lung (Mar. 22, 2010) (on 
file with the Robert C. Byrd Center for Legislative Studies) 
(emphasis partially added). 
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provisions in two statutes are in irreconcilable conflict, or where 
the latter Act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is 
clearly intended as a substitute” a court may find that the later 
statute implicitly repeals provisions of the earlier one.  Branch v. 
Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273, 123 S.Ct. 1429, 1441 (2003)  (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Implied repeals, however, are not 
favored absent a “clearly expressed congressional intention.”  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  As we have noted, there 
must be a stark inconsistency between the two sections of the 
statute: “[thus, a] conflict that is merely cosmetic or that relates 
to anything less than the operative legal concepts is not enough; 
there must be a clear repugnancy between the two provisions.”  
Tineo v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 382, 391 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
We are satisfied that by removing the limiting clause in 
section 932(l), enacted in the 1981 amendments, Congress made 
its intentions clear and manifest: retroactively to January 1, 
2005, to provide benefits automatically to the eligible survivors 
of miners who were receiving benefits at the time of their death. 
 Even though we take the presumption against implied repeals 
into consideration, we are constrained to hold section 1556, as 
Congress’ latest legislation on the subject of survivors’ benefits, 
negates any language suggesting that an eligible survivor of a 
miner who was eligible to receive benefits at the time of his 
death must file a new claim in order to prove that the miner’s 
death was due to the effects of pneumoconiosis.  
One section of the Act, section 932(l), provides that 
under no circumstances should eligible survivors be required to 
file a new claim for benefits if the miner was eligible to receive 
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benefits “under this subchapter at the time of his or her death.”  
On the other hand, section 922(a) indicates that an eligible 
survivor has to prove that a miner was eligible to receive 
benefits under the subchapter and is required to file a claim to 
prove that pneumoconiosis caused the miner’s death.  The 
language of the two sections clearly is in conflict in the 
operative legal concepts governing survivors’ benefits to the 
extent that PPACA section 1556 has amended section 932(l) of 
the Act.  We think it evident that there is no way to reconcile the 
two sections, and B&G has not provided any such method 
except by rendering section 1556 so far as at issue here a nullity. 
 This is a step we will not take as the choice we face is between 
treating section 1556 as having been a nullity from the outset 
and regarding the inconsistent earlier sections of the Act as 
partially repealed and we can make that choice by applying the 
principle the Supreme Court has set forth that “[w]e will not 
infer a statutory repeal unless the later statute expressly 
contradict[s] the original act or unless such a construction is 
absolutely necessary . . . in order that [the] words [of the later 
statute] shall have any meaning at all.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home 
Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 662, 127 S.Ct. 
2518, 2532 (2007) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 548, 108 
S.Ct. 1372, 1381-82 (1988)).   
A literal reading of the plain language of section 932(l), 
the history of the Act, and the purpose of the PPACA all lead us 
to the conclusion that in order for section 932(l), as amended by 
section 1556(b) of the PPACA, to have any meaning at all with 
respect to claims of survivors, it must operate to ensure that any 
eligible survivor of a deceased miner who was eligible to 
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receive benefits at the time of his death does not have to file a 
new claim or otherwise establish that pneumoconiosis was a 
cause of the miner’s death in order to continue receiving 
benefits.  Therefore, we will proceed on the basis of our 
conclusion that section 932(l) automatically awards benefits to 
eligible survivors of miners who were eligible to receive 
benefits at the time of their deaths and address B&G’s original 
constitutional contentions. 
 B.  Does the PPACA Amendment to Section 932(l)      
                Violate Due Process? 
 As we have indicated we would do, we turn to the 
contention that B&G initially advanced in these proceedings: 
that section 1556 is unconstitutional.  B&G first argues that the 
PPACA section 1556 amendment of section 932(l) violates the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause which “prohibits the 
United States, as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits the States, from depriving any person of 
property without due process of law.”  Dusenbery v. United 
States, 534 U.S. 161, 167, 122 S.Ct. 694, 699 (2002) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  B&G does not distinguish between 
procedural due process violations and substantive due process 
violations and, accordingly, it makes arguments under both 
aspects of the Fifth Amendment.  See United States v. Salerno, 
481 U.S. 739, 746, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2101 (1987) (stating that the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects individuals 
against violations of both substantive and procedural due 
process).  We nevertheless will discuss B&G’s procedural due 
process and substantive due process arguments separately.   
 
 41 
  Procedural due process protects B&G’s fundamental 
“opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner.”  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 
96 S.Ct. 893, 902 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
B&G argues that the PPACA amendment violates its procedural 
due process rights inasmuch as it precludes a mining company 
from introducing evidence that a miner who was receiving 
benefits during his or her lifetime died from causes unrelated to 
pneumoconiosis and thus “denies the employer of all 
opportunity to a fair and just hearing.”  Pet’r’s br. at 30.  B&G 
grounds its procedural due process argument against section 
1556 on a line of Supreme Court cases which, according to 
B&G, have held that statutes containing irrebuttable 
presumptions violate due process.  See Heiner v. Donnan, 285 
U.S. 312, 52 S.Ct. 358 (1932); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 
S.Ct. 1586 (1971); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 
1208 (1972); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 93 S.Ct. 2230 
(1973).   
Even assuming we agreed, which, as we explain below 
we do not do, with B&G’s characterization of section 1556 as 
creating an irrebutable presumption, we would disagree with the 
argument that such a presumption would violate B&G’s 
procedural due process rights.  A plurality of the Supreme Court 
has rejected the theory that a legislature’s use of an irrebuttable 
presumption automatically violates the Due Process Clause.  See 
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 120-21, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 
2340-41 (1989) (plurality op.).  In Michael H. the Supreme 
Court considered the constitutionality of a California statute 
containing an irrebuttable presumption that a child born to a 
married woman living with her husband is a child of the 
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marriage between the husband and the wife.  The plaintiff in 
Michael H. fathered a child with the wife of another man and 
argued that the California statute’s irrebuttable presumption 
violated his procedural due process rights inasmuch as the 
presumption prevented him from proving that he was the 
biological father before the state terminated his liberty interest in 
his relationship with his child.  The Court stated that:  
A conclusive presumption does, of course, 
foreclose the person against whom it is invoked 
from demonstrating, in a particularized 
proceeding, that applying the presumption to him 
will in fact not further the lawful governmental 
policy the presumption is designed to effectuate.  
But the same can be said of any legal rule that 
establishes general classifications, whether 
framed in terms of a presumption or not. . . [O]ur 
irrebuttable presumption cases must ultimately be 
analyzed as calling into question not the adequacy 
of procedures but . . . the adequacy of the ‘fit’ 
between the classification and the policy that the 
classification serves.   
Id. at 120-21, 109 S.Ct. at 2340-41 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted).  Thus, as we understand 
Michael H. the statute was applied to provide that a child 
born to a married woman living with her husband is 
“deemed” to be a child of the marriage regardless of the 
identity of the biological father. 
 In light of Michael H., even when a legislature employs 
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an “irrebutable presumption,” the question is not one of 
procedural fairness, but rather whether the “plaintiff 
demonstrates that the inference is not ‘rationally related’ to a 
legitimate legislative classification . . . .”  Malmed v. 
Thornburgh, 621 F.2d 565, 574 (3d Cir. 1980).  Accordingly, 
even assuming that we agreed with B&G’s characterization of 
section 1556(b) as creating an irrebuttable presumption, we 
would reject its argument that such a presumption necessarily 
would violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  In 
any event, by eliminating the need for a widow to show 
causation between the miner’s pneumoconiosis and his death 
Congress simply has set forth as substantive law a provision that 
the survivor of a miner receiving benefits is entitled to 
survivor’s benefits regardless of the absence of causation 
between the miner’s pneumoconiosis and his death.  As we 
explain below, we cannot understand why it cannot do so as 
there is no principle of law barring it from adopting that 
approach.  Thus, properly understood, section 1556 does not 
create a presumption at all.  We reiterate that the problem with 
B&G’s procedural due process argument is that it depends on a 
non-existent overarching principle that a mining company 
cannot be responsible to a survivor for benefits on account of a 
miner’s death unless the miner died from pneumoconiosis.  
 B&G also makes a substantive due process argument 
insofar as it contends that the 2010 Amendment has no rational 
basis and runs counter to the stated purpose of the Act.  
Specifically, B&G argues that section 932(l) creates an 
irrebuttable presumption that a miner who was receiving black 
lung benefits at the time of his death died of pneumoconiosis, 
thereby transforming “what has always been a compensation 
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system based on death due to pneumoconiosis, into a pension 
system that awards survivor benefits upon the death of a miner, 
without regard to the cause of the miner’s death.”  Pet’r’s br. at 
30.  Thus, B&G concludes that the 2010 PPACA Amendment 
“has no rational basis and indeed runs counter to the stated 
purpose of the Act -- to compensate victims and survivors for 
disability or death caused by pneumoconiosis.”  Id. at 31.  We, 
however, point out that the basic premise of B&G’s argument is 
faulty as it is clear that from the time of the adoption of section 
932(1) in the 1977 amendments until 1981 the Act provided for 
survivors’ benefits in cases of miners who died with, even if not 
from, pneumoconiosis.  Nevertheless we will continue our 
substantive due process discussion as B&G has advanced it.   
“Substantive due process prevents the government from 
engaging in conduct that shocks the conscience . . . or interferes 
with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”  Salerno, 
481 U.S. at 746, 107 S.Ct. at 2101 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  In order to prove that a statute “adjusting the 
burdens and benefits of economic life” violates substantive due 
process, B&G must show that Congress “acted in an arbitrary 
and irrational way” by enacting the legislation.  Turner Elkhorn, 
428 U.S. at 15, 96 S.Ct. at 2892; see also Stern v. Halligan, 158 
F.3d 729, 731 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that general economic and 
social welfare legislation violates substantive due process only 
when it fails to meet a minimum rationality standard).  Showing 
that Congress acted arbitrarily and irrationally in enacting 
legislation is an “extremely difficult” standard to meet.  Stern, 
158 F.3d at 731 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
The Act as the PPACA has amended it comes to us with the 
presumption of constitutionality and B&G has the burden to 
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negate every conceivable reason which might support the 
legislative classification that Congress chose.  See FCC v. 
Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2102 
(1993). 
 In challenging section 1556 and thus the classification, 
B&G first argues that section 1556 has no rational basis by 
pointing to the lack of legislative history relating to the 
amendment.  In that regard, B&G contrasts section 1556 with 
prior amendments to the Act which, according to B&G, “were 
preceded by lengthy and detailed reports and public hearings . . . 
.”  Pet’r’s br. at 31.  Moreover, B&G asserts that most 
legislators did not read the entire bill and that the debate over 
the PPACA focused on the much more controversial individual 
mandate found in 26 U.S.C. § 5000A,20 a provision which 
already has been the subject of multiple constitutional 
challenges.21
                                                 
20 “When it takes effect in 2014, the mandate will require all 
‘applicable individual[s]’ to either obtain a level of health 
insurance that qualifies as ‘minimum essential coverage’ or pay 
a penalty.”  N.J. Physicians Inc. v. President of the U.S., 653 
F.3d 234, 236 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a), 
(b), and (c)). 
  However, the Supreme Court squarely has 
   
21 We are aware that there has been a division among the courts 
on the constitutional questions regarding the mandate but that 
issue is entirely distinct from the question here.  Moreover, 
B&G does not contend that we should make a constitutional 
inquiry into the PPACA beyond considering section 1556. 
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rejected the premise that a legislature must articulate the rational 
basis underlying a particular statute.  Beach Commc’ns, 508 
U.S. at 315, 113 S.Ct. at 2102 (“[B]ecause we never require a 
legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is 
entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the 
conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually 
motivated the legislature.”).  “[A] legislative choice is not 
subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational 
speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.”  Id. 22
 Second, B&G argues that section 1556 violates 
substantive due process inasmuch as it is incompatible with the 
general purpose of the Act.  Specifically, B&G contends that the 
purpose of the Act “is to provide benefits for disability or death 
due to pneumoconiosis,” pet’r’s br. at 31, and section 1556, by 
amending section 932(l) so that survivors of miners do not have 
to prove that pneumoconiosis caused a miner’s death, has no 
rational basis and indeed “thwart[s], rather than further[s], the 
stated purpose of the [Act].”  Pet’r’s reply br. at 10. 
  
Therefore, we will not consider the circumstance that the 
legislative history of section 1556 is very thin, or that there 
seems to have been no debate regarding that section in 
Congress, in determining whether section 1556 violates the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  
                                                 
22 In Beach Communications the Court applied the rational basis 
test in the context of an equal protection analysis.  Nevertheless, 
“the analysis under substantive due process is essentially the 
same as an equal protection analysis, i.e., is there a rational basis 
underlying the legislation in question?” Cospito v. Heckler, 742 
F.2d 72, 84 (3d Cir. 1984).  
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B&G’s second argument also runs headlong into 
Supreme Court precedent.  In Turner Elkhorn the Supreme 
Court considered due process challenges to a number of 
provisions of the Act, including 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(3), which, 
unlike amended section 932(l), explicitly provides for an 
irrebuttable presumption: if a miner suffers from complicated 
pneumoconiosis, “there shall be an irrebuttable presumption that 
he is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis or that his death 
was due to pneumoconiosis, or that at the time of his death he 
was totally disabled by pneumoconiosis as the case may be.”23
 More importantly for purposes of this case, the Court also 
  
30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(3).  Relying on the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Stanley and Vlandis, the same cases B&G cites for 
its procedural due process arguments, the district court 
determined that this provision violated due process because it 
prevented Turner Elkhorn from presenting evidence of the effect 
of pneumoconiosis on a miner’s disability.  The Supreme Court 
held that the district court erred in its conclusion.  First, the 
Court held that section 921(c)(3)’s use of the term “irrebuttable 
presumption” was not dispositive because the effect of the 
presumption was “simply to establish entitlement in the case of a 
miner who is clinically diagnosable as extremely ill with 
pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment.”  428 
U.S. at 22, 96 S.Ct. at 2896.  The Court did not doubt that 
Congress could establish such an entitlement without violating 
the Due Process Clause and thus its choice of statutory language 
did not invalidate an enactment “when its operation and effect 
are clearly permissible.”  Id. at 24, 96 S.Ct. at 2896. 
                                                 
23 There is a period before “as” in the statute. 
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addressed the mine operators’ argument that the retroactive 
application of section 921(c)(3) to miners who stopped working 
before Congress passed the Act was arbitrary and irrational.  
The Court recognized that the presumption that a miner who 
was diagnosed with complicated pneumoconiosis died from that 
disease presented a problem with regard to the miners who 
stopped working before the Act’s enactment inasmuch as the 
justification the Court found for retroactive application of the 
Act was “to spread costs in a rational manner by allocating to 
the operator an actual cost of his business . . . [and] a miner’s 
death that is due to causes other than the operator’s conduct can 
hardly be termed a ‘cost’ of the operator’s business.”  Id. at 24-
25, 96 S.Ct. at 2897.24
We think it clear, however, that the benefits 
authorized by [section 921(c)(3)]’s presumption 
of death due to pneumoconiosis were intended not 
simply as compensation for damages due to the 
miner’s death, but as deferred compensation for 
injury suffered during the miner’s lifetime as a 
result of his illness itself. 
  The Court concluded, however, that the 
irrebuttable presumption in section 921(c)(3) was justified for 
other reasons:  
. . . 
                                                 
24 The Court, earlier in its opinion, rejected the mine operators’ 
general argument that the Act was unconstitutional because it 
retroactively imposed liability on mine operators for past acts 
which were legal and unknown to be dangerous at the time the 
acts occurred.  428 U.S. at 14-20, 96 S.Ct. at 2892-94.   
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 In the case of a miner who died with, but 
not from, pneumoconiosis, before the Act was 
passed, the benefits serve as deferred 
compensation for the suffering endured by his 
dependents by virtue of his illness.  And in the 
case of the miner who died with, but not from, 
pneumoconiosis after the Act was passed, the 
benefits serve an additional purpose: The miner’s 
knowledge that his dependent survivors would 
receive benefits serves to compensate him for the 
suffering he endures.         
Id. at 25, 96 S.Ct. at 2897 (emphasis partially added). 
B&G argues that the director’s reliance on Turner 
Elkhorn is misplaced inasmuch as section 932(l) was not 
enacted until 1978, about two years after the Turner Elkhorn 
decision.  B&G further contends that the presumptions in Turner 
Elkhorn dealt “only with the most severe and irreversible form 
of the illness known as ‘complicated pneumoconiosis’” and thus 
“section 921(c)(3) reasonably fits the logical formula: if a miner 
has a diagnosis of complicated pneumoconiosis, he is, by 
definition, totally disabled.”  Pet’r’s reply br. at 9.  Finally, B&G 
asserts that the Court decided Turner Elkhorn “before Congress 
had available to it the overwhelming evidence of the failures of 
the claims administration of the [Act],” and, since then, 
Congress has eliminated three of the rebuttable presumptions 
found in section 921(c).  Id.   
B&G’s attempt to distinguish Turner Elkhorn is 
unconvincing because its arguments do not address why the 
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Court’s analysis in Turner Elkhorn does not apply to, and 
ultimately override, B&G’s assertion that section 932(l) is 
irrational and violates the stated purpose of the Act because it 
awards benefits to miners who may have died from causes other 
than pneumoconiosis.  B&G’s argument that complicated 
pneumoconiosis is “totally disabling” is inapposite inasmuch as 
under the Court’s holding in Turner Elkhorn, if a miner is 
diagnosed with complicated pneumoconiosis his death still 
could be caused by circumstances wholly unrelated to 
complicated pneumoconiosis, and the miner’s surviving 
dependent nonetheless would be entitled to benefits under 
section 921(c)(3).25
                                                 
25 The Court in Turner Elkhorn suggested that the question of 
whether the retroactive application of section 921(c)(3) violated 
due process protections might be “a more difficult problem” if 
the statute authorized awarding benefits to the survivor of a 
miner who did not die from pneumoconiosis and who was 
completely unaware of and unaffected by pneumoconiosis or a 
miner who died from pneumoconiosis but whose dependents 
were unaware or unaffected in any way by his condition.  428 
U.S. at 26-27, 96 S.Ct. at 2897.  B&G does not suggest that the 
Campbells, or even a significant group of claimants for 
survivors’ benefits, fit into either of these categories.    
  Indeed, B&G’s position in this case 
undercuts the basis for its own argument: the DOL found that 
Ernest Campbell was totally disabled during his lifetime, albeit 
from non-complicated pneumoconiosis, and yet B&G argues 
that he died from causes unrelated to that totally disabling 
disease.  In addition, the circumstance that the Court decided 
Turner Elkhorn about two years before Congress enacted section 
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932(l) does not change the similarity of the effect and purpose of 
the two sections of the Act.  Nor does Congress’ later 
amendment of section 921(c)(3) have any bearing on the Court’s 
due process analysis in Turner Elkhorn.   
In any event, the similarity between section 932(l) and 
section 921(c)(3) demonstrates that the rational basis the Court 
found in Turner Elkhorn is also a rational legislative basis for 
amended section 932(l).  Congress’ decision automatically to 
extend benefits to eligible survivors regardless of whether a 
miner died due to the effects of pneumoconiosis represents a 
legislative choice to compensate a miner’s dependents for the 
suffering they endured due to the miner’s pneumoconiosis or as 
a means to provide a miner with peace of mind that his 
dependents will continue to receive benefits after his death.  We 
have no reason to override Congress’ implicit determination that 
the choice was reasonable.  Therefore, based on the Court’s 
rationale in Turner Elkhorn, we cannot say that it is irrational or 
arbitrary for Congress to extend survivors’ benefit to the 
dependents of miners who are receiving black lung benefits at 
the time of their death regardless of the cause of death. 
Further, we disagree with B&G’s argument that amended 
section 932(l) is inconsistent with the Act’s general statement of 
purpose found in 30 U.S.C. § 901(a).  While the automatic 
award of benefits to the dependents of miners who received 
benefits during their lifetimes will result in some miners’ 
dependents receiving benefits who would not have received 
benefits under the pre-PPACA version of the Act as, indeed, 
was a purpose for which Congress amended section 932(l) with 
section 1556, it also unquestionably will further Congress’ goal 
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of “ensur[ing] that in the future adequate benefits are provided 
to coal miners and their dependents in the event of their death or 
total disability due to pneumoconiosis.”  30 U.S.C. § 901(a).  
The circumstance that the section 1556 amendment may be more 
inclusive than it need be to further that particular goal is not 
grounds to invalidate it under a rational basis review.  See Brian 
B. ex rel. Lois B. v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 230 F.3d 582, 587 (3d 
Cir. 2000).  Moreover, to the extent that amended section 932(l) 
conflicts with section 901(a), we note that, as a basic canon of 
statutory construction, “[s]pecific terms prevail over the general 
in the same or another statute which otherwise might be 
controlling.”  D. Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208, 
52 S.Ct. 322, 323 (1932).  Surely section 932(l) is more specific 
than section 901(a). 
 Finally with respect to substantive due process, we find 
no merit in B&G’s argument that section 1556 will “effectively 
revert[] the Act to the disastrous pre-1981 period when benefits 
were awarded with little, if any, medical evidence of disability 
or death due to pneumoconiosis[.]”  Pet’r’s br. at 32.26  In 
characterizing the period between 1977 and 1981 as 
“disastrous,” B&G relies on GAO Reports from 1980, 1982, and 
1990 showing that the DOL approved black lung claims based 
on inadequate medical evidence.  We see no reason, however, 
why these reports would bind a different Congress in 2010.27
                                                 
26 Of course, the fact that B&G considers the pre-1981 period as 
“disastrous” does not make that so as we question whether the 
miners would agree with that characterization. 
  
 
27 We also point out that, as the director explains in great detail 
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Nor is it for us, under a rational basis review, “to judge the 
wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.”  Parker v. 
Conway, 581 F.3d 198, 202 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Beach 
Commc’ns, 509 U.S. at 313, 113 S.Ct. at 2101). 
 In sum, we reject B&G’s substantive due process 
challenge to section 1556 of the PPACA because B&G has 
failed to show that Congress acted in an arbitrary or irrational 
manner in enacting the amendment.  As the director aptly points 
out, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides no 
remedy to B&G predicated on its disagreement with Congress’ 
policy decision to amend the Act. 
C. Does the PPACA Amendment to Section 932(l) 
Violate the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause? 
 
 The Fifth Amendment provides that the federal 
government may not take private property for public use without 
providing just compensation.  U.S. Const. amend. V.  A 
“taking” under the Fifth Amendment is not limited to the 
government’s physical invasion of property but also may result 
from the application of an economic regulation, such as the Act. 
 See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522-23, 118 S.Ct. 
2131, 2146 (1998) (plurality op.).  Though a Takings Clause 
inquiry and the substantive due process analysis are correlated 
                                                                                                             
in his brief, the PPACA amendments did not resurrect all of the 
provisions which governed black lung benefits determinations 
prior to the 1981 amendments.  See Resp.’s br. at 24-26. 
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“[t]here is a fundamental conceptual difference between a 
takings claim and a substantive due process claim,” namely that 
the former is a property rule while the latter is a liability rule.  
Unity Real Estate Co. v. Hudson, 178 F.3d 649, 658-59 (3d Cir. 
1999) (“If the government pays just compensation, it may take 
private property for public use under the Takings Clause.  Due 
process protections, by contrast, define what the government 
may not require of a private party at all.”).     
Of course, as with a substantive due process challenge, “a 
party challenging governmental action as an unconstitutional 
taking bears a substantial burden.”  Eastern Enters. 524 U.S. at 
523, 118 S.Ct. 2146.  B&G’s burden is even greater in this case 
than might be otherwise so inasmuch as the Supreme Court 
strongly has suggested that a statute substantially similar so far 
as germane here to amended section 932(l) would not violate the 
Takings Clause.  See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 
475 U.S. 211, 223, 106 S.Ct. 1018, 1025 (1986) (“Although 
both [Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 
717, 104 S.Ct. 2709 (1984)] and Turner Elkhorn were due 
process cases, it would be surprising indeed to discover now that 
in both cases Congress unconstitutionally had taken the assets of 
the employers there involved.”).         
The process for evaluating a regulation’s constitutionality 
under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause involves an 
examination of the “justice and fairness” of the governmental 
action.  Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 523, 118 S.Ct. at 2146 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  While the “justice and 
fairness” inquiry is “ad hoc and fact intensive,” the Supreme 
Court has identified three factors which have “particular 
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significance” in the inquiry.  Id.  (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The three factors are: “(1) the economic impact of the 
regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to which the regulation 
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations; and 
(3) the character of the governmental action.”  Connolly, 475 
U.S. at 224-25, 106 S.Ct. at 1026 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  B&G argues that each of the three factors which 
courts weigh in deciding whether a regulation amounts to an 
unconstitutional taking weighs in its favor.    
1.  Economic Impact 
 B&G places most of its Takings Clause argument on the 
economic impact that it contends amended section 932(l) will 
have on it in particular and the coal industry in general.  
Specifically, B&G argues that application of amended section 
932(l) to provide benefits in cases such as Campbell’s would 
impose a considerable financial burden on the coal industry 
inasmuch as that “financially strapped” industry would have to 
pay an estimated $210 million in benefits, the justification for 
the requirement of which is unsupported by adequate medical 
evidence and, further, that retroactive application of the 
amendment will require a lump sum payment of approximately 
$1 billion dollars.  Pet’r’s br. at 35-36.  B&G arrives at the $1 
billion dollar figure by taking the GAO’s estimate in the 1980 
report that companies paid $312.9 million dollars in lump sum 
payments on a retroactive basis and, because benefit rates now 
are three times higher than in 1977, extrapolating that the 
retroactive cost of amended section 932(l) will be approximately 
$1 billion. 
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 As the director points out, however, the economic impact 
analysis is not simply an exercise in comparing the cost of a 
regulation against a regulated entity’s ability to bear the cost.28  
Thus, we have held that even if an economic regulation caused 
the complete destruction of a company, the occurrence of that 
consequence would not serve as proof that the regulation 
effectuated an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth 
Amendment.  See Unity Real Estate Co., 178 F.3d at 677.  
Rather, the touchstone of the economic impact question is 
proportionality: “the size of a liability only weighs in favor of 
finding a taking insofar as it is out of proportion to the 
legitimate obligations society may impose on individual 
entities.”  Id.  Thus, in Connolly the Supreme Court held that the 
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (“MPPAA”) did 
not violate the Takings Clause despite the fact that the MPPAA 
“completely deprives an employer out of whatever amount of 
money it is obligated to pay to fulfill its statutory liability.”29
                                                 
28 Furthermore, even if this was the proper inquiry, B&G 
provides no support for its assertion that the coal industry is 
“financially strapped,” and does not provide any indication of its 
own inability to bear the extra cost of increased benefits under 
section 1556.  Moreover, it is not clear that it would be proper, 
in this context, to rely on financial projections based on 30-year 
old data. 
 
 
29 Congress enacted the MPPAA in 1980 to address the problem 
of employers terminating their participation in multiemployer 
pension plans and by doing so adversely affecting the solvency 
of those plans.  The MPAA “requires that an employer 
withdrawing from a multiemployer pension plan pay a fixed and 
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475 U.S. at 225, 106 S.Ct. at 1026.  The calculation of an 
employer’s liability under the MPPAA “is not made in a 
vacuum” because the amount the employer pays “directly 
depends on the relationship between the employer and the plan 
to which it had made contributions.”  Id. at 225, 106 S.Ct. at 
1026.   
Similarly, B&G’s liability under the amended section 
932(l) is not made in a vacuum inasmuch as the amount that the 
amended section requires B&G to pay is based on the incidence 
of totally disabling pneumoconiosis among B&G’s former 
employees.  Therefore, the situation here is not an instance 
where “some people alone” are forced “to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public 
as a whole,” Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 
S.Ct. 1563, 1569 (1960), but a “rational measure to spread the 
costs of the employees’ disabilities to those who have profited 
from the fruits of their labor. . . .”  Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 
18, 96 S.Ct. at 2893. 
 B&G contends, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Eastern Enterprises, that “the liability that the new amendment 
will impose is disproportionate to the coal industry’s historic 
experience with the plan.”  Pet’r’s br. at 36.  The controversy in 
                                                                                                             
certain debt to the pension plan.  This withdrawal liability is the 
employer’s proportionate share of the plan’s ‘unfunded vested 
benefits,’ calculated as the difference between the present value 
of the vested benefits and the current value of the plan’s assets.” 
 Connolly, 475 U.S. at 217, 106 S.Ct. at 1022 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). 
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Eastern Enterprises arose from private agreements between 
certain coal mine operators and the United Mine Workers 
Association providing for health care funds for coal workers.  
524 U.S. at 505-09, 118 S.Ct. at 2137-40.  Beginning in 1974, 
the funds also provided for lifetime health benefits to retired 
miners and their widows.  Id. at 509, 118 S.Ct. at 2139-40.  In 
1992, when there was a concern that the funds would become 
insolvent, Congress passed the Coal Act, which required coal 
mine operators that had signed the private agreements to 
contribute to new multiemployer benefit plans that would 
provide the promised health care coverage to miners and their 
widows.  Id. at 514, 118 S.Ct. at 2141-42.   
Eastern Enterprises, a company which had stopped 
mining coal in 1965, challenged the Coal Act as imposing a 
liability constituting an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth 
Amendment.  A plurality of the Supreme Court held that the 
Coal Act was an unconstitutional taking as to Eastern 
Enterprises on the basis that even though it never signed onto 
the 1974 agreement providing lifetime health benefits to retired 
miners, the Coal Act imposed severe financial liability on it for 
such benefits disproportionate to Eastern Enterprises’ 
experience with the benefits program.  Id. at 528-29, 118 S.Ct. 
at 2149.  Justice Kennedy, providing the fifth vote to strike 
down the Coal Act as it applied to Eastern Enterprises, 
concurred in the judgment but stated that the governmental 
injury to Eastern Enterprises was not a taking, 524 U.S. at 542, 
118 S.Ct. at 2155-56, and instead found that the legislation 
violated Eastern Enterprises’ substantive due process rights 
because of its retroactive nature.  Id. at 547-49, 118 S.Ct. at 
2158-59.  As a result of the division on the Court, the holding in 
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the case was limited in scope as it applied only to Eastern 
Enterprises. 
 We have indicated that the fractured nature of the 
Supreme Court’s opinion makes it “difficult to distill a guiding 
principle from Eastern [Enterprises].”  Unity Real Estate, 178 
F.3d at 658.  However, even if the plurality opinion was binding 
precedent, which it is not,30
           2.  Interference With Investment Backed Expectations 
 the lesson of Eastern Enterprises is 
that a regulation violates the Takings Clause in circumstances in 
which it imposes liability which is not proportional to a party’s 
experience with the problem that the regulation addresses.  See 
id. at 672.  As we discussed above, the amendment to section 
932(l) does not pose a disproportionality problem because B&G 
is only liable for paying benefits to the survivors of the miners it 
employs or employed and who received, or are receiving, federal 
black lung benefits at the time of their death.  That those 
benefits are “substantial,” or are larger than B&G previously 
had anticipated, are not factors that undermine our conclusion in 
the economic impact inquiry.  Therefore, we find that the first 
factor in our Taking Clause inquiry that Eastern Enterprises sets 
forth weighs against finding an unconstitutional taking under the 
Fifth Amendment.          
                                                 
30 “[T]he only binding aspect of the fragmented decision in 
Eastern Enterprises is its specific result, i.e., the [Coal Act] is 
unconstitutional as applied to Eastern Enterprises.”  Shenango 
Inc. v. Apfel, 307 F.3d 174, 185 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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 B&G argues that while “the coal industries and its 
insurers must be, and have been prepared for legislative 
adjustments that further the purpose of the Act, the 2010 
amendments, reversing the progress that has been achieved since 
the 1981 amendments, could not have been predicted.”  Pet’r’s 
br. at 38.31
                                                 
31 Though B&G regards the addition of the causation of death 
requirement in the 1981 amendments as “progress,” clearly 
Congress took a different view when it enacted the PPACA as 
even B&G recognized when it filed its brief as at that time it did 
not challenge the director’s view as to how Congress intended 
section 1556 to be applied. 
  We agree with the director, however, that it is 
unreasonable for B&G to argue that it was blindsided by 
Congress’ amendment of section 932(l).  We previously have 
stated, in relation to the Coal Act, that “[coal] companies had no 
reasonable expectation that the government would not expand 
its regulation of health benefits in the coal industry, given the 
history of labor unrest and government intervention.” Unity Real 
Estate, 178 F.3d at 663; see also Connolly, 475 U.S. at 227, 106 
S.Ct. at 1027 (“Those who do business in the regulated field 
cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by 
subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end.”) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  B&G’s claim 
that it could not have foreseen Congress’ extension of survivors’ 
benefits to the dependents of miners who were receiving 
benefits during their lifetimes but who died from causes 
unrelated to pneumoconiosis is particularly meritless because 
the law provided for that exact scenario for claims filed between 
1978 after the adoption of section 932(1) in the 1977 
amendments and 1981.  Therefore, we find that the second 
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factor in our Taking Clause inquiry also weighs against finding 
a taking. 
 3.  The Nature of the Governmental Action 
 In order to satisfy the third factor of the Takings Clause 
inquiry, B&G falls back on its due process argument that 
Congress did not debate, discuss, or study adequately the Act 
before amending it in the PPACA.  As we already have rejected 
this argument in our due process discussion, we see no need to 
address it further here.  We note, however, that this argument 
misapplies the governmental action factor of the Taking Clause 
inquiry, which normally asks whether the regulation “is a 
physical invasion of land and thus more likely to constitute a 
taking or a ‘public program adjusting the benefits and burdens 
of economic life to promote the common good,’ which 
ordinarily will not be compensable.’” New Jersey v. United 
States, 91 F.3d 463, 468 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 
2659 (1978)).  Section 932(l) clearly does not effectuate a 
physical taking of B&G’s property, nor, as we discussed above, 
does it implicate “fundamental principles of fairness underlying 
the Takings Clause” as the challenged statute did in Eastern 
Enterprises.  524 U.S. at 537, 118 S.Ct. at 2153 (“When . . . [a 
legislative] solution singles out certain employers to bear a 
burden that is substantial in amount, based on the employers’ 
conduct far in the past, and unrelated to any commitment that 
the employers made or to any injury they caused, the 
governmental action implicates fundamental principles of 
fairness underlying the Takings Clause.”).  Therefore, this factor 
also does not support B&G’s argument that section 932(l) is an 
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unconstitutional taking of its property under the Fifth 
Amendment. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 Under 30 U.S.C. § 932(l), as amended by section 1556 of 
the PPACA, Campbell is entitled to survivor’s benefits without 
having to file a new claim for benefits or otherwise refile or 
revalidate Ernest’s claim for benefits inasmuch as she filed her 
claim for survivor’s benefits after January 1, 2005.  Moreover, 
section 932(l) as amended does not violate the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause or Takings Clause.  
Consequently, we do not need to consider B&G’s argument that 
Campbell failed to establish that pneumoconiosis caused 
Ernest’s death.32
  
  Accordingly, we will deny B&G’s petition for 
review of the order of the Benefits Review Board dated August 
30, 2010.       
                                                 
32 If we concluded that the Act required proof that 
pneumoconiosis caused Ernest’s death, we would remand the 
case to the Board for consideration of the question of whether 
Campbell adequately has proven that pneumoconiosis caused or 
hastened Ernest’s death.  
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. 
 
 Judge Greenberg has done yeoman work in crafting 
the majority opinion in this case, so it is with special regret 
that I cannot join it.  I agree with the majority’s thorough 
recapitulation of the various iterations of the Black Lung 
Benefits Act (Act).  My point of departure lies in the analysis.  
The internal inconsistencies of the statute, as amended by the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), leave 
me befuddled as to the correct answer to the question 
presented.  For the following reasons, I concur only in the 
judgment. 
 As my colleagues correctly note, Congress amended 
the Act in 1981 and “eliminated survivors’ automatic 
entitlement to benefits for claims filed on or after January 1, 
1982.”  This change was effectuated by adding the phrase 
“except with respect to a claim filed under this part on or after 
the effective date of the Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 
1981” to 30 U.S.C. § 932(l).  Congress likewise amended 30 
U.S.C. §§ 901, 921(a), and 922(a)(2), which made clear that 
survivors were entitled to benefits only after showing that the 
miner’s death was “due to pneumoconiosis.” 
 The PPACA restored § 932(l) to its status previous to 
the 1981 Amendments.  Accordingly, no “eligible survivor” 
of a miner was required to file a new claim for benefits.  If we 
view § 932(l) in a vacuum, this is an easy case.  But reading a 
statute in a vacuum is improper, and we must consider the 
context of each statute we interpret.  Robinson v. Shell Oil 
Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340–41 (1997); United States v. Tupone, 
442 F.3d 145, 151 (3d Cir. 2006).  For reasons we may never 
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know, the Congress that passed the PPACA in 2010 failed to 
amend §§ 901, 921, and 922, as Congress had done in 1981.  
This omission is no small matter.  As the law is presently 
written, the congressional findings and declaration of purpose 
(§ 901) contain a causation requirement expressing an intent 
to compensate survivors and dependents of miners “whose 
death was due to such disease.”  Similarly, §§ 921 and 922 
retain the causation requirement.  The majority refers to this 
state of affairs as “conflicting language,” internal 
inconsistency,” id. at 22, 30, and so “clearly in conflict” that 
“there is no way to reconcile [§§ 922(a) and 932(1)]”, id. at 
32.  Despite these apt phrases, the majority finds it “quite 
clear” that § 932(l) ensures the continuation of benefits for an 
eligible survivor of a miner irrespective of the cause of the 
miner’s death.  Notwithstanding my view that the matter is 
anything but clear, even the majority’s formulation begs the 
question because it sheds no light on who is an “eligible 
survivor.” 
 As the United States Code has grown in scope and 
complexity, the federal courts are increasingly called upon to 
harmonize apparent inconsistencies within or between 
statutes.  See, e.g., New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. 
Ct. 2635, 2640 (2010); Hinck v. United States, 550 U.S. 501, 
507–10 (2007); Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 153–56 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  Sometimes an apparent contradiction or 
inconsistency can be resolved without dissent because one or 
more of the options presented conduces to an absurd result.  
See, e.g., Abbott v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 18, 27–28 
(2010).  But here, there is nothing absurd about either result.  
Are survivors automatically entitled to benefits, or must they 
show that the miner’s death was “due to pneumoconiosis”?  
These equally plausible options appear to be the verbal 
equivalent of M.C. Escher’s infinite staircase.  Prior to 1981, 
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we knew that causation was not required.  From 1982 until 
2010, we knew that causation was required.  After the 
PPACA, it’s anyone’s guess. 
 In the final analysis, I concur in the result reached by 
my colleagues in spite of the uncertainty expressed here.  As 
the majority notes, before the Benefits Review Board, B&G 
did “not dispute that [Campbell] need not prove that the 
miner’s death was due to pneumoconiosis.”  Regardless 
whether this is viewed as a species of waiver, it is enough of a 
thumb on the scale to tilt the decision in favor of Mrs. 
Campbell.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur in the 
judgment. 
